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Michael W. SCOTT, London School of Economics and Political ScienceRejoinder toWillerslev, Rane, and Christian Suhr. 2018. “Is there a place for faith in anthropology?
Religion, reason, and the ethnographer’s divine revelation.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 8
(1/2): 65–78A number of apparent claims that turn out to be red
herrings render Rane Willerslev and Christian Suhr’s
article curiously protean. But if these pseudotheses are
set aside, something interesting and potentially helpful
emerges. This article may be read, I suggest, as entailing
an anthropological theology according to which any
form of agency might mediate God or constitute divine
agency.
Once identiﬁed, this rethinking of agency in relation
to divinitymay furthermore speak to the aims and claims
of another anthropological theology—namely, Bruno
Latour’s (2013a: 295–325) rethinking of religion as a
“mode of existence” among the Moderns. Both of these
theological projects offer models of God as a paradox,
a Becoming-Being in which the antinomies of relation-
ism and essentialism converge: God is nothing but an
open-ended compositional ﬂux eternally generated from
within by local relations of mediation and is therefore
also an always already transcendent essence.
But whereas Latour asserts that the beings of themode
of existence he calls “religion”may be distinguished from
all others by their “saving” works of calling persons into
being out of nothing-but-ﬂux,Willerslev and Suhr’s char-
acterization of “disruptive experiences” during anthropo-
logical ﬁeldwork as sites of “revelation” would seem to
imply that this excludes too many agents from divine
agency. The ethnographic examples they adduce as in-heory. Volume 8, number 1/2. DOI: http://dx.do
Theory. All rights reserved. 2575-1433/2018/081
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se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms dices of divine intervention suggest that, among others,
the kinds of beings Latour analyzes as the beings of
“metamorphosis” may likewise mediate and generate
divinity, not only as saving grace but also as subjectivity-
disintegrating rupture. Brought together, these two ap-
proaches to anthropological theology begin to intimate,
I suggest, what it might look like to bring the Moderns
back into “diplomatic relations” with other collectives,
cocomposing, in Latour’s terms, a new intersection or
“crossing” between religion and metamorphosis able to
resist the violence of iconoclasm and antifetishism.
In order to stage such a potentially productive encoun-
ter between the anthropological theologies of Willerslev
and Suhr, on the one hand, and Latour, on the other, I
must ﬁrst offer a few analytical observations about the
latter.
I understand Latour to be a relationist philosopher
(see Harman 2009). For him, every kind of thing is a
relational composition, and there are no a priori essences.
Yet Latour’s thinking goes beyond relations and gives
essences their ontological due as well. Latour (2013a:
259–81) argues that relationally constituted entities ac-
quire essences owing to the mode of existence he calls
“habit.” It is habit that gives things their cumulative
character as they negotiate the vicissitudes of discontin-
uous relational becoming over time. Essence builds up
over the duration of any kind of entity, making it thei.org/10.1086/698409
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Michael W. SCOTT 84distinctive, nonrepeatable thing that it is, however com-
posed of or composing of other entities it may be. Such
essences are inseparable from the relations that grow
them, and vice versa.
As a Modern, I can readily grasp the nature of rela-
tionally constituted essences when I contemplate the
beings of the mode of existence Latour calls “reproduc-
tion,” such as a human being whose cellular and other
subcutaneous networks of composition are changing all
the time yet whose subjectivity and appearance remain
relatively stable until dementia or death breaks them
down. What is arguably harder to apprehend, however,
yet crucial to Latour’s project, is his claim that the beings
of religion—including but not limited to the being some
might choose to call God—are no less relationally con-
stituted essences than the beings of other modes; they
are simply composed under very different conditions
by very different networks of translation and media-
tion.
Latour has long sought to renew religion (explicitly
identiﬁed with Christianity) for the Moderns by redi-
recting it away from misguided efforts to compete with
science in the quest to access remote beings through
chains of reference and toward the delicate task of in-
dividuating and hallowing beings close at hand (includ-
ing, perhaps, nonhumans; see Latour 2009, 2013b). If
habit already renders essences coeval with the relations
that compose them, religion, according to Latour, en-
dows beings as habit-based essences with yet another
layer of deﬁnition—with soul, saved here and now in
an ever-present eschatological fulﬁllment. But the bearer
of this salvation is no radically transcendent deity made
immediately present. Salvation is always worked out lo-
cally whenever one neighbor precipitates and seals an-
other with the ancient afﬁrmations: “Behold! I am here
with you!” “Fear not! Rejoice!” (or prelinguistic vibra-
tions to that effect). For Latour, there is no question of
a preexistent God apart from these mediating agencies
and the irreducible complexity of becoming in which
they participate. Like every other kind of entity, God ac-
quires an essence only by virtue of the myriad relations
that generate divinity as saving presence. All of that said,
however, it might well be argued that, once framed as
eternal, this process itself obviates the distinction be-
tween a transcendent and a relational divine essence. If
compositional becoming is conceptualized as unbegun,
and if the capacity to mediate salviﬁc divine presence is
reckoned to nonhuman agents, then perhaps there never
was when God was not.This content downloaded from 082.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms But what of the beings that allegedly do precisely the
opposite, the beings of the mode of existence Latour
(2013a: 181–205) calls “metamorphosis”? These transfor-
mational beings, Latour says, assail and rupture habit-
based essences at random, casting fragile subjectivities
into crisis, hijacking their trajectories, causing them to
sicken or gomad, or even arresting their becomings alto-
gether in death. The Moderns, Latour explains, have
largely internalized and psychologized these beings, but
other collectives continue to generate and often venerate
them as agents whose dangerous powers may sometimes
be elicited as helpful. Latour (183) laments that, in their
past dealings with other collectives, the Moderns have
tended to construct a crossing between metamorphosis
and religion that pits the beings of these twomodes against
each other. Posited as messengers of the one true God,
the beings of religion can only ever oppose the beings of
metamorphosis as idolaters and their idols, fallen an-
gels, or other rebellious entities.
Yet Latour himself seems to want to keep these two
kinds of beings separate from one another in ways that
render a posticonoclastic metamorphosis–religion cross-
ing difﬁcult to picture. Latour insists that, although the
beings of metamorphosis may be enlisted for good, espe-
cially for healing, they remain fundamentally amoral
and indiscriminate, using and diffusing others merely
as leverage for their own wild leaps of transformation.
In contrast, he claims, the beings of religion alone offer
themselves as leverage for the assumption of others to se-
cure personhood.How can this clearly evaluative criterion
of differentiation not reproduce the old metamorphosis–
religion crossing as iconoclasm, replete with its evil im-
pulse to purge the world of evil?
Willerslev and Suhr’s contribution to anthropologi-
cal theology may provide resources for thinking about
this question, but only once it is determined what the
article is chieﬂy about. At several points, the authors
seem to present as their core claim the idea that anthro-
pological insights are best achieved when “disruptive
experiences” push the anthropologist to the limits of his
or her reason, inducing a Kierkegaardian “leap of faith”
into “a deeply insecure, paradoxical state of being,” or
“existential uncertainty” (66). They furthermore seem
to want to demonstrate that the primary insight thus
gained is that non-Western others, who may justiﬁably
be said to have beliefs, dwell in this same existential
doubt, uncertain about the premises of their own on-
tologies and cosmologies and about why things are
the way they are. These lines of argumentation clearly27.002.012 on June 21, 2018 01:22:29 AM
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formation of the problem of “apparently irrational be-
liefs” (see Scott 2013)—and form part of a retreat from
and contamination of the concept of ontology as alleg-
edly implying a perfect rational order.
I contend, however, that, by the end, this article
comes to be about something different and more inter-
esting. It turns out to be about disruptive experiences
that bring the anthropologist to the limits—not of rea-
son, per se—but of self-willed intentional agency as a
means to moral transformation as well as cognitive in-
sight, necessitating a leap of faith in a divine agency ca-
pable of effecting these desired changes. This theme be-
gins to come to the fore in the section on Socrates and
has taken over by the conclusion: “Knowledge depends
not only on the actions we take, but equally importantly,
on our ability to receive” (74).
This agenda for anthropology as theology is, in other
words, a transformation of Christian pietism, ﬁltered
through Kierkegaard and augmented by Amira Mitter-
maier’s passion-centered analysis of Suﬁ dream visionar-
ies (on Kierkegaard and pietism, see Barnett 2011). Recall
that, for Kierkegaard ([1849] 1989: 115), the opposite of
faith is not reason, but sin—disobedience, the will to au-
tonomous self-mastery apart from God. Pietism, like its
many descendant holiness practices within Christianity,
is all about surrendering self-will and agency and under-
going a passion of the soul—being acted upon by God,
whose grace alone is sufﬁcient for faith and regeneration.
(Islam can entail this struggle as well, cf. Mittermaier
2012.) Transposed into the register of anthropology,
this tradition becomes the surrender of agency—in the
form of intentional self-governed ethnographic analy-
ses—in favor of disruptive experiences through which
divine intervention may bestow a higher wisdom that
somehow becomes a lived practice, a moral revolution
of the self and its daily engagement with others. (On Soc-
rates as a “philosophical icon” among pietists, see Barnett
2011: 101.)
It is at this point, arguably, thatWillerslev and Suhr’s
project begins both to intersect with and diverge from
Latour’s in thought-provoking ways. Like Latour’s be-
ings of religion, the thing Willerslev and Suhr call God
or divinity appears to be a relationally composed essence,
a transcendence generated and made present by many
mediators closer at hand. Remarkably, however, unlike
themediators in Latour’smode of religion, themediators
described here bear little relation to the Christian tradi-
tion. For Willerslev and Suhr, it seems, there is no limitThis content downloaded from 082.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms to what might turn out to be divinity calling. Entities as
diverse as a moose cow and calf appearing in human
form as dream visitors, demonic jinn in possession of a
devout Muslim, the visionary dreams of Suﬁ practition-
ers, ﬁeldwork consultants in general, Socrates’ famous
“daimon,” the operations of myth in the mind of Lévi-
Strauss—indeed, hidden aspects of the self, such as the
unconscious—can render themystery of divinity present
and unsettling to the self. God is Other, but also poten-
tially all others, even self: “One’s own agency becomes in-
distinguishable from action on the part of the divine”
(Howland 2008: 5, quoted in Willerslev and Suhr). Here
we are moving toward anthropology as mysticism.
The diverse entities Willerslev and Suhr present as
agents of divine revelationmight, on that account alone,
seem to qualify as beings of religion in Latour’s terms,
save for the fact that they do not necessarily save in
Latour’s terms. In Latour’s terms, these alleged bearers
of divine presence look, in fact, like beings of metamor-
phosis—beings that discompose, disorient, derange, dis-
place, and desubjectivize those who encounter them. As
analyzed by Willerslev and Suhr, in other words, these
entities challenge Latour’s criteria for classifying the
beings of religion as separate from the beings of meta-
morphosis and seem to urge the conclusion that the
predicates “being of religion” and “being of metamor-
phosis” can both be true of the same agent.
Willerslev and Suhr have, in effect, formulated a new
anthropological version of Martin Luther’s doctrine of
the Deus absconditus (the hidden and unknowable God),
or the more popular notion that evil, suffering, and even
destructive personal agents such as Satan constitute and
serve the work of the “left hand of God.” Contrary to La-
tour’s accounts, the beings of religion are not always edify-
ing to the subject; sometimes they are simultaneously
the beings of metamorphosis, tearing down the subject
in order to remake it again, disabusing it of its preten-
tions to autonomy before restoring it as a gift.
Might this recognition that the beings of religion
among the Moderns can also be beings of metamor-
phosis aid diplomatic relations between the Moderns
and other collectives? Could the anthropological pie-
tism developed by Willerslev and Suhr help to stage a
new metamorphosis–religion crossing without need
of either antipagan or antibiblical polemics? Or would
such a crossing likely lead to a category error, the mis-
taken amalgamation of distinct kinds of beings? Would
something important thus be lost to the cocomposition
of the pluriverse? These are not new debates in the-27.002.012 on June 21, 2018 01:22:29 AM
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thropological discourses may yet prove revelatory.References
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